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Workplace safety was a centerpiece of Progressive Era reforms. Between
1869 and the early 1900s state governments established safety regulations
for mines and factories and reformed the liability for workplace accidents.
In the 1910s nearly all state governments adopted workers’ compensation
laws that changed the employers’ liability for workplace accidents from
common law negligence liability to a form of strict liability. The safety re-
formers’ stated aims were to reduce the risk faced by workers and ensure
that the families of workers injured or killed in accidents received reason-
able medical care and compensation for lost earnings. Yet large employers
often wielded signiﬁcant clout in state government during this period and
likely worked to shape the legislation to aid their own interests. This paper
explores the extent to which large employers, measured by average number
of employees, subverted the safety reform process, including the adoption
of safety legislation, its scope, and the resources devoted to enforcement of
the laws.
Deﬁning subversion is a controversial issue, and scholars have diﬀerent
opinions on the scope of what should be considered subversion. In their
discussion of the rise of the regulatory state, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003,
p. 402) suggest that “subversion” can be deﬁned as a series of legal or ille-
gal strategies that powerful interests might follow to weaken the impact of
regulations or shape the rules to their beneﬁt.
The legal ones include acquiring favorable legislation and regulation
(even after an accident), lobbying for an appointment of friendly law en-
forcers (including both judges and regulators), hiring top lawyers, or us-
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associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.ing delay tactics in case of a suit. Illegal subversion strategies include in-
timidating and bribing judges, regulators, or juries.
Their deﬁnition covers a broad range of activity, so it is useful to divide sub-
version into subcategories. The pressure for favorable legislation and regu-
lation and lobbying for friendly enforcers might well be considered lobby-
ing or “rent-seeking” behavior that would be followed by any interest group.
Success in such lobbying has been described as “capture” of the legislature
or the regulator in various studies.1Although unions and others might cap-
ture the legislature or the regulator, most discussions of capture examine
ironic situations where the target of the regulation, the employer in this case,
controls the process. The hiring of top lawyers and the legal use of delay tac-
tics in suits or administrative hearings could be more narrowly deﬁned as
“gamesmanship,” while the illegal practices are pure “corruption.”
The workplace safety laws were the result of the conﬂicts and compro-
mises that arose from the interest group struggles between reformers and
employers, and large employers played a central role in the process. Re-
formers sought to impose the workplace safety changes on large employ-
ers because they saw the increased mechanization in their workplaces as a
source of increased risk and they feared that large ﬁrms were wielding too
much power over the existing system. Large employers might have followed
two diﬀerent strategies that would have subverted the reformers’ goals:
work to shape new laws in such a way to raise their rivals’ costs, or follow
a defensive strategy at every turn.
I follow a two-pronged approach to examining how large employers in-
ﬂuenced the safety laws. First, I analyze the variation across states and time
to establish the relationship between the average number of employees per
establishment and the extent of regulation. A ﬁnding that large employers
were associated with earlier adoption of regulation, more breadth of regu-
lation, and more resources devoted to enforcement is consistent with either
reformers imposing regulations on large ﬁrms or large ﬁrms’ raising rivals’
costs. Had large employers followed a defensive strategy, we would expect
them to be associated with slower adoption, limited breadth, and fewer re-
sources devoted to enforcement. Second, I supplement the quantitative
analysis with analytical narratives that describe in more depth the extent to
which employers shaped the legislation and the actual enforcement of the
laws in various states. The results show that there is no single coherent
story that can be told about all industries. In coal mining large employers
followed a defensive strategy, limiting the breadth of regulation, pressing
for regulations that were enforced more against workers than against em-
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1. Becker (1983), Stigler (1971), Pelzman (1976), and Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock
(1980) discuss how interest groups might capture the legislative process. Once the rules are in
place we might also see both capture and corruption of the regulatory process (Kolko 1963,
1965).ployers and managers, and weakening the enforcement of the laws. In man-
ufacturing, on the other hand, safety regulations were introduced earlier in
states with larger average establishment sizes. This ﬁnding suggests that re-
formers may have succeeded in imposing regulations on large manufactur-
ing employers. However, the ﬁnding is also consistent with large ﬁrms
working to raise rivals’ costs. Analytical narratives suggest that manufac-
turing employers at times shaped the legislation to their beneﬁt and that
the regulations were often poorly enforced.
9.1 Large Firms and Regulation
Progressive Era social reformers, workers, and unions called for safety
regulations as a means to resolve “market failures.” They perceived that
expansions in the use of machinery and increases in the pace of work, typ-
ically in large ﬁrms, increased the dangers that workers faced. They argued
that employers proﬁted by skimping on safeguards, that labor markets pro-
vided inadequate wages to compensate workers for workplace dangers,
and that insurance and the legal system were designed, both in theory and
even more so in practice, to limit payments to injured workers. They antic-
ipated that the reforms they proposed would contribute to better work-
place safety and increase the actual payments received by injured workers.
These changes would leave workers better oﬀ because wages would not
fully adjust downward.2
A number of Progressive leaders, including Woodrow Wilson, saw regu-
lation as a means of curbing the worst excesses from the expansion of large
ﬁrms. Using the reformers’ claims as a guide, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003)
built an elegant formal model that examines optimal accident prevention
in a situation where amoral ﬁrms are willing to subvert the existing regula-
tory system when the beneﬁts of subversion exceed the costs.3A set of rules
that might be optimal in the absence of subversion could be suboptimal if
ﬁrms have incentives to subvert the system. The rules under negligence li-
ability in the late 1900s called for full compensation of the injured worker
if the worker could show in court that the employer had not exercised due
care. As employers increased the number of workers, the potential for
large-scale accidents and thus the stakes for court decisions on liability
rose accordingly. Even accidents with only a single accident victim could
lead to high stakes for a larger ﬁrm because a negligence decision that went
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2. Fishback and Kantor (1995, 2000) ﬁnd that when workers’ compensation was intro-
duced union members actually did not experience wage cuts that oﬀset improvements in
postaccident payments, while nonunion workers experienced reductions to varying degrees.
Even nonunion workers who experienced reductions saw improvements in their welfare be-
cause they were better insured against accidents.
3. For discussions of optimal design of regulation and liability, see Landes and Posner
(1987), Shavell (1987), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2003).against the employer might set a precedent that raised the probability that
the employer would lose in later cases. The greater stakes for large em-
ployers increased the beneﬁt to the employer of subverting the process. By
introducing safety regulations, which imposed smaller penalties prior to
accidents for failure to follow established procedures, and workers’ com-
pensation, which called for workers to receive two-thirds or less of their
lost earnings, the stakes of regulatory decisions were lowered.4 Large em-
ployers had less incentive to subvert the process than before, so that regu-
lations and workers’ compensation might have worked better than negli-
gence liability with no regulation.
The relationships described by these reform hypotheses suggest that re-
formers in states with larger employers would have anticipated greater
beneﬁts from regulation and thus pressed harder. If reformers imposed the
regulations on larger employers, states with larger ﬁrms would have
adopted regulations earlier and been more likely to have had a broader set
of regulations. The impact of large ﬁrms on state decisions about enforce-
ment resources is less clear. Reformers intent on making sure that the reg-
ulations were followed by large ﬁrms typically demanded more resources
per worker for enforcement. But there may have been countervailing ef-
fects that would have weakened this demand. If the cost of inspection in-
cluded a substantial ﬁxed cost for visiting an establishment plus a cost per
worker in the establishment, states with larger establishments could have
reached the same level of enforcement as states with smaller establishments
with a smaller budget per worker. This potential lower enforcement cost
per worker might have oﬀset the reformers’ greater demand for enforce-
ment resources in states with larger employers.
Reformers, however, were not the only groups determining safety legis-
lation. The laws were forged through the interplay of interest group strug-
gles, coalition formation, and compromise in state governments between
1869 and 1930. Large employers, in particular, wielded signiﬁcant political
clout.5 Not only did they have more funds to lobby legislators and ﬁnance
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4. The stakes involved in many decisions were lower under workers’ compensation than
under negligence liability. Under negligence liability the stakes in each decision were high be-
cause each involved an all-or-nothing decision about fault. In contrast, most workers’ com-
pensation disputes arose over the extent of the injury and measures of the workers’ wage in
determining the appropriate values to plug into the state’s formula for compensation. The re-
maining decisions, however, were all-or-nothing decisions with far-reaching consequences
for workers’ compensation policy. Decisions on what constituted a work-related injury and
opinions on whether the employer was willfully negligent (which removed the restrictions on
compensation) established the boundaries of workers’ compensation and were similar in
scope to the stakes in a major negligence case. Given the large number of settlements under
negligence liability, the annual number of these boundary decisions may have been similar to
the number of negligence cases that were actually decided by the courts.
5. For studies of the roles played by major employers during the Progressive Era, see, for
example, Wiebe (1962), Weinstein (1967), Lubove (1967), Moss (1996), Graebner (1976),
Aldrich (1997), and Fishback and Kantor (2000).political campaigns, but large ﬁrms employed large proportions of work-
force. In 1909 establishments with over 500 workers employed up to 58 per-
cent of manufacturing workers in some states (24 to 28 percent nationwide)
despite accounting for less than 2 percent of all establishments. To the ex-
tent that employers could inﬂuence their workers’ votes, they could deliver
a substantial part of the electorate. Thus, government oﬃcials faced lower
political organizing costs in dealing with a few large ﬁrms than in negoti-
ating with groupings of small ﬁrms.
As large employers sought legislation favorable to their own interests,
they would have followed one of two paths consistent with the broad deﬁ-
nition of subversion: a defensive strategy of obstructionism against the de-
mands of reformers or attempts to adopt and design regulations to raise
rivals’ costs. In following the defensive strategy employers would have
prevented or slowed the adoption of safety legislation by pressuring legis-
lators to kill the bills in committee or on the legislative ﬂoor. If that failed,
they would have worked to limit the scope of the legislation through
amendments or compromise proposals, while removing the teeth of the
regulation by providing inadequate funds for enforcement. If legislation
were enacted, employers would have sought to weaken it further by con-
trolling regulators and actively ﬁghting ﬁnes in court. If larger employers
adopted a full-scale defensive strategy, states with larger employers would
have adopted the regulations later, chosen regulations with less breadth,
and provided fewer resources for enforcement.
Large employers might have adopted an alternative strategy to press for
regulations that raised their rivals’ costs.6 By lobbying for regulations that
codiﬁed their own practices they could have raised rivals’ costs and not
their own by forcing other employers to switch practices. To the extent that
there were economies of scale or high ﬁxed costs to compliance, the aver-
age costs of complying were larger for smaller ﬁrms. States with larger
ﬁrms therefore would have been more likely to press for earlier adoption,
an expanded scope of regulations, and more resources for enforcement to
insure that the other ﬁrms were forced to comply. The attempt to raise ri-
vals’ costs might have beneﬁted only large ﬁrms at the expense of other
ﬁrms and workers. On the other hand, large employers would have found
the political sledding smoother if their proposals had meant an improve-
ment in the welfare of workers at the ﬁrms that had to change to comply
with the new regulations. Large employers were more likely to pay higher
wages, oﬀer better beneﬁts, provide model housing and towns, and provide
safer workplaces (Jacoby 1997, chap. 1; Fishback 1992, chap. 9; Brandes
1970). Regulations raising safety standards with only limited loss in em-
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6. Ann Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas (1985) claim that the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s (OSHA) persistence despite relatively little measured impact on ac-
cident rates since 1971 is the result of lobbying by large and unionized employers.ployment would have led reformers, workers in smaller ﬁrms, and unions
to become willing members in a coalition with large ﬁrms to lobby for the
new legislation.
9.2 Workplace Safety Regulation and Liability Reform, 1869–1930
Just after the Civil War the government’s role in workplace safety was
largely conﬁned to adjudicating disputes over injury claims in the common
law courts. Over the next several decades, the structure of common-law
workplace accident compensation evolved through a series of court deci-
sions.7 Under the full-blown liability system in the late nineteenth century,
workplace accident compensation was based on common law rules of neg-
ligence combined with the defenses of assumption of risk, fellow-servant,
and contributory negligence. If a worker was injured on the job, he bore the
burden of proving that his employer had failed to exercise due care in pre-
venting the accident and that the employer’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury. Judge Learned Hand once described due care as requir-
ing the employer to prevent accidents when his costs of accident prevention
were lower than the expected costs of the accident. If an injured worker was
able to show his employer’s negligence, then he was theoretically entitled to
compensation up to the amount of his ﬁnancial losses from the accident
(lost wages and medical expenses) plus remuneration for “pain and suﬀer-
ing.” Even if the employer was found negligent he might not be liable if he
could invoke any of three defenses: that the employee had assumed the risks
associated with the employment (assumption of risk); that a coworker (fel-
low servant) had caused the accident; or that the worker himself was negli-
gent or had not exercised due care (contributory negligence).8 The studies
of accident causes in the late 1890s and early 1900s often suggested that
worker fault was the cause of a very large percentage of the accidents, so
court rulings of no compensation were likely in a large number of cases.
Lawrence Friedman (1985, pp. 300–301) argues that the system devel-
oped to encourage industrial enterprise; the courts knew that imposing
strict liability on industrial enterprises would have stunted the growth of
industry.9 Employers likely had a hand in the development of the system as
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7. For discussions of the early evolution of the common law of workplace accident com-
pensation cases, see Tomlins (1988 and 1993, chap. 10). The basic principles for liability would
continue to evolve into the early 1900s. See Friedman (1985), Friedman and Ladinsky (1967),
and Fishback and Kantor (2000, chap. 2).
8. See Posner (1972, p. 32), Landes and Posner (1987), and Fishback and Kantor (2000,
pp. 30–33).
9. Gary Schwartz (1981) challenges this “industry subsidy” view with an ample number of
exceptions from his analysis of cases in California and New Hampshire. Numerous economic
analyses have suggested that negligence liability combined with the three defenses can be an
optimal accident prevention system in theory under speciﬁc conditions. See Landes and Pos-
ner (1987), Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), Shavell (1987).they defended themselves against negligence suits and lobbied elected oﬃ-
cials in the selection of judges. In examining the actual operations of the
system, Shawn Kantor and I (2000) found little or no documented evidence
that bribery of judges and juries was a signiﬁcant problem in negligence li-
ability cases.10
On the other hand, the high costs of going to court might have con-
tributed to signiﬁcant gamesmanship in settlement negotiations. Empirical
studies suggest that under the de facto system the legal rules provided a base-
line guide as to what to expect when people went to court. The compensa-
tion in settlements was loosely correlated with the de jure rules, but there was
a great deal of noise in the system. The fear of delay, of gamesmanship by
the employer or the insurer, and the workers’ own high costs of going to
court (25 to 40 percent of the compensation in contingency fees plus emo-
tional costs) might have prevented some workers with legitimate claims from
receiving compensation. In the samples of settlements collected by various
state employer liability commissions, few families received payments that
might match the present value of a lifetime stream of earnings. On the other
hand, some workers with more generous employers, with employers seeking
to avoid the nuisance of a suit, or with better access to legal advice might well
have fared better than the expected payments under the highly restrictive de
jure rules (Fishback and Kantor 2000). The views of accident causation
evolved away from blaming the worker in the early 1900s with the publica-
tion of Crystal Eastman’s Work Accidents and the Law. Had workers’ com-
pensation not been adopted, it is probable that more workers would have re-
ceived compensation after Eastman’s ﬁndings had become widespread.
If there was gamesmanship and subversion of the negligence liability
system, it might well have been practiced more by the middlemen than by
the employer. In nearly every state liability commission report, employers
and workers complained of the large transactions costs in the system.
Lawrence Friedman (1985, p. 484) summarizes these claims: the system
“siphoned millions of dollars into the hands of lawyers, court systems, ad-
ministrators, insurers, claims adjusters. Companies spent and spent, yet
not enough of the dollars ﬂowed to injured workmen.” We have no way of
knowing how much of the transactions costs were devoted to gamesman-
ship, but the primary beneﬁciaries of the negligence system may well have
been the trial attorneys, an interest group that opposed workers’ compen-
sation in some states.
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10. To develop a sense of the publicity of judicial bribery just prior to the introduction of
workers’ compensation I created a sample of corrupt events using the ProQuest search engine
on the New York Timesindex for the period 1900 to 1910 using the word combination “judge”
and “bribe.” The search unearthed ﬁve episodes where judges had reported to the press on at-
tempts to bribe them but there was no evidence that they had accepted the bribe. In seven
cases the judges were charged with and sometimes convicted of bribery or corruption, but
only two could be related to workplaces.9.2.1 Coal Safety Regulations
As the negligence system evolved, states began to supplement it with di-
rect regulation soon after the Civil War. The ﬁrst industry to be widely reg-
ulated was coal mining, among the most dangerous industries of the era.
Pennsylvania led the way in adopting coal mining regulations in 1869 for
anthracite mines. The states with signiﬁcant bituminous coal production
introduced regulations between 1872 and 1912 in the order presented in
Table 9.1.11Federalinvolvement began with the formation of the Bureau of
Mines in 1911, but the agency was informational and did not obtain coer-
cive powers until 1941 (Graebner 1976).
As a rough guide to some of the correlates of the adoption of the law,
table 9.1 includes information on workers per mine, the number of coal
workers, and the number of coal union chapters as of 1880. Simple corre-
lations suggest that states with larger mines tended to adopt earlier. The
correlation between average mine size in 1880 and the year of adoption is
–0.4. The simple correlation seems to be inconsistent with the defensive
hypothesis, while being consistent with the reform and raising-rivals’-costs
views of large ﬁrms. However, there were other important factors inﬂuenc-
ing the timing of adoption. For example, unionization and the overall size
of industry in 1880 were also negatively correlated with the year of adop-
tion; the simple correlations are –0.55 and –0.49, respectively. The multi-
variate analysis that follows isolates the impact of each, holding the other
factors constant.
The early regulations were rudimentary and were focused on mapping the
mines, providing appropriate ventilation, and preventing explosions. Often
they were targeted at smaller operations where the operators’ knowledge of
customary safety practices was likely to be more limited. As the technology
of mining improved with the introduction of cutting machines, electricity,
and mechanical motors, the regulations expanded, particularly after 1900.
To capture the major changes after 1900, I develop a mine regulation index
that counts the number of regulations that the states had adopted from the
following list: the mine must be sprinkled or rock dusted, a ﬁre boss must ex-
amine the mine for gas daily in gaseous mines, mine management must pro-
vide adequate timbers to prop the roof, underground electric wires must be
292 Price V. Fishback
11. Although this paper focuses on industry, railroad regulation and liability also went
through a series of transformations. The dangers in the railroad industry were a driving force
in the development of the common law liability regime (Tomlins 1993, chap. 10). State rail-
road commissions between 1840 and 1890 imposed some rudimentary safety regulations.
Federal safety regulations began in 1892 with the Railroad Safety Appliance Act. The safety
laws for railroads were targeted speciﬁcally at railroading at the state and federal levels. Ac-
cidents for interstate railroad workers are still handled under a negligence liability system, al-
though the fellow-servant defense and assumption-of-risk defenses have been eliminated and
contributory negligence has been replaced with comparative negligence. See Clark (1891),



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.insulated, miners must not ride on coal cars underground, permissible ex-
plosives must be used, state inspectors must pass a qualifying exam, inspec-
tors can close the mine immediately for some violations, inspectors have the
power to make arrests for safety violations, mine foremen must be licensed
by a state board, all miners must be licensed by a state board, foremen must
ensure that all men have training, and the foreman must make a minimum
number of visits to the workplace each day. As seen in table 9.1, the number
of clauses varied between zero in some states without mining laws to eight in
Pennsylvania. By 1930 most states had expanded coverage, and the number
ranged from three in Texas to ten in Pennsylvania.
A key to eﬀective laws is their enforcement. Table 9.1 contains the in-
spection budget in 1967 dollars per coal worker, which is based on the
salaries and the number of inspectors listed in the mining law or in appro-
priations bills for each state. Most inspection budgets in 1902 were less
than $2 per worker, although New Mexico and Utah were spending over $4
per worker. Generally, the budgets had expanded along with the breadth of
the laws by 1930.
9.2.2 Manufacturing Safety Regulations
The states’ interest in regulating safety in factories also developed soon
after the Civil War. Massachusetts led the way in 1869 in establishing a bu-
reau to collect information on wages and working conditions for factory
workers, and roughly half of the states had followed suit by 1890 (see table
9.2). Massachusetts was the ﬁrst state to add teeth to the law by establish-
ing factory inspectors in 1879. Roughly 40 percent of the states added a
factory inspector within ﬁve to ﬁfteen years after creating a labor bureau
or department (see table 9.2). Some states like West Virginia and Tennessee
provided for an inspector without actually appointing one. Table 9.2 also
contains information on average establishment size, total manufacturing
workers, and the number of chapters of trade unions in 1880. As was the
case for the coal regulations, simple correlations show that all three were
associated with earlier adoption (–0.43, –0.51, and –0.40, respectively, with
the initial laws and –0.51, –0.56, and –0.35, respectively, with the factory
inspector laws). The factory safety laws were amended during the Progres-
sive Era in response to new technologies as well as to the grisly lessons
learned from horrible accidents like the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory ﬁre in
New York in 1910.
9.2.3 Liability Law Changes
The increasing use of factory and mine inspectors coincided with the
states’ experimentation with employer liability laws that limited one or
more of the three defenses in the 1890s and 1910s.12 Unions and workers
Did Large Employers Subvert Workplace Safety Reform, 1869 to 1930? 295























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.quickly became dissatisﬁed with the inadequacy of employer liability laws.
In addition, employers sought relief from increasing uncertainty about the
three defenses and a seeming increase in “jackpot” awards. Insurers, fur-
thermore, sought ways to resolve problems with moral hazard and adverse
selection in insuring workers. The solution for all was workers’ compensa-
tion.
The move to workers’ compensation in most states in the 1910s altered
the liability rules in mining and manufacturing from negligence liability to
strict liability. The laws established that all workers injured in the course of
employment or in activities arising out of employment were expected to
receive compensation from employers. Unlike negligence liability, which
was supposed to fully compensate workers for their loss, workers’ compen-
sation imposed limits so that injured workers were to be paid a maximum
of two-thirds or less of their income loss. Maximums on weekly payments
meant that many workers received substantially less than two-thirds of
their income while injured.
Ultimately, large employers strongly inﬂuenced the adoption of workers’
compensation legislation. Fishback and Kantor (2000) ﬁnd that the ma-
jority of people in each of the major interest groups—employers, workers,
and insurers—gained from its passage. Employers saw a reduction in un-
certainty about large jury awards and managed to pass much of their in-
creased insurance premiums back to their workers in the form of higher
wages. Workers on average received higher accident payments than under
negligence liability and were better insured even if their wages adjusted
downward. Insurers saw an expansion in their business, despite the intro-
duction of state insurance in a number of states.
Most states developed some form of administrative body to replace the
courts in administering workers’ compensation. A handful of states, led by
Wisconsin in 1911, carried the process a step further and created industrial
safety commissions that not only administered workers’ compensation but
expanded into a rule-making body that wrote an extensive safety code for
Wisconsin industry. As seen in table 9.2, eighteen states had established in-
dustrial commissions by 1930. However, only California, Massachusetts,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah had made substantial use of
their rule-making ability.
9.3 The Role of Average Employer Size in the 
Development of Safety Regulations
The simple correlations between the year of adoption and average size
from 1880 using the data from tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggest that safety legis-
lation was adopted earlier in states with larger employers. Yet we also know
that earlier adoption was related to more unionization and the overall
number of workers to be regulated, so a multivariate analysis is needed to
298 Price V. Fishbackisolate the impact of larger employers. The adoption of legislation was a
dynamic process that took place over at least thirty years, so it is also im-
portant not only to capture the diﬀerences in key variables in cross-section
in 1880 but also to take into account the changes in the key variables over
time. Finally, the models of the relationship between large employers and
regulation predict relationships that extend beyond the adoption of the
laws to their scope and the resources devoted to enforcement. Therefore, I
developed a state-level panel data set to examine the relationship between
the average size of employers and the timing of adoption of safety legisla-
tion, the breadth of coverage of regulations, and the resources devoted to
enforcing the rules.
Table 9.3 shows the predictions from the various models for the rela-
tionship between large employers and changes in safety regulations. It is
important to consider how well the measure of employer size ﬁts the theo-
retical concepts of employer size in the models. The measure of size used is
the average number of workers per establishment (or per mine) because it
is the only measure of size that is consistently available for the years 1870
through 1912, when the leading mining and manufacturing safety regula-
tions were ﬁrst adopted.13 Average establishment size might diﬀer in two
states because the entire distribution of establishments in one state has
shifted upward or because the distribution in one state is more skewed to-
ward larger establishments.
In the hypothesis that reformers imposed regulation on large employers,
both general increases in size and skewness toward very large ﬁrms might
be considered important. Reformers worried about general increases in
size across the entire distribution because larger establishment size was
typically associated with increased mechanization that might have con-
tributed to greater accident risk. Meanwhile, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003)
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13. Information was not available on the size of multi-establishment ﬁrms. The average es-
tablishment size understates the average size of ﬁrms because it does not take into account
ﬁrms that had multiple establishments. My impression is that multi-establishment ﬁrms more
commonly ran large establishments so that the measurement error might not be a serious
problem. Further, multiestablishment ﬁrms tended to own establishments in multiple states.
Their political inﬂuence in those states was likely to be inﬂuenced by the size of their estab-
lishments in those states.
Table 9.3 Predicted signs of the relationship between average workers per
establishment (mine) and safety regulations
Probability of  Enforcement  Breadth 
Motives adoption budget of laws
Reform Positive Uncertain Positive
Large employers’ defensive strategy Negative Negative Negative
Large employers raise rivals’ costs Positive Positive Positiveemphasize the importance of very large ﬁrms in their descriptions of re-
form in the face of potential subversion. In the employer defense hypothe-
sis both a skewed distribution with a few very large ﬁrms or a general in-
crease in the size of all ﬁrms would have made it easier for employers to
resist reform eﬀorts. In the skewed distribution a few large ﬁrms with many
employees faced low costs of organizing and would have greater resources
with which to mount their defenses. This result would hold even if larger
average ﬁrm size represents larger size across the entire distribution of
ﬁrms. The increase in size meant that each ﬁrm might have more resources
to devote to lobbying, while successful employer lobbies would face lower
costs of organizing because fewer ﬁrms would be necessary to reach criti-
cal mass. The raising-rivals’-costs hypothesis depends primarily on skew-
ness toward large ﬁrms in the distribution because one set of employers is
seeking to impose regulations that would be costly to another set of em-
ployers. In that case one might expect that large ﬁrms would have more
success in raising rivals’ costs when the share of very large establishments
is higher either as a share of the number of establishments or as the share
of employment in those ﬁrms.
When the data are available to make comparisons after 1900, it appears
that the measure of average establishment size used here likely captures
some of the diﬀerences in skewness toward large establishments. The cor-
relation between average number of workers per establishment and the per-
centage of establishments with more than 500 workers in manufacturing in
the states is 0.887 in 1904, 0.928 in 1909, and 0.928 in 1914. The correlation
between average workers per establishment and the share of workers in es-
tablishments employing over 500 workers is 0.68 in 1909 and 0.65 in 1914.
In estimating the impact of large employers, the analyses control for in-
terest group pressure from unions, who wielded inﬂuence in the states
where they had a strong presence, as well as the number of workers in-
volved in the activity to be regulated. Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) suggest
that there may be substantial ﬁxed costs to regulation; eﬃciency concerns
imply that regulations will not be established until the population to be reg-
ulated is large enough that the beneﬁts of regulation overcome these ﬁxed
costs. Larger populations might also be associated with more regulation in
the raising-rivals’-cost model. The returns to large ﬁrms from using regu-
lation to keep rivals out would rise signiﬁcantly as the overall size of the in-
dustry increased. In several empirical tests Mulligan and Shleifer (2004)
ﬁnd regulatory populations to be associated with expanded regulations in
a series of settings. In the analysis that follows, larger regulatory popula-
tions also contributed to earlier adoption of the initial manufacturing and
coal regulations. Finally, regional diﬀerences in attitudes toward regula-
tion are controlled with a dummy for the southern states in the adoption
regressions and state ﬁxed eﬀects when examining coal inspection budgets
and the breadth of coal regulations. The analysis that follows suggests that
300 Price V. Fishbacksouthern states were slower to adopt factory inspection regulation and coal
mining regulations.14
9.3.1 Establishment Size and the Introduction 
of Manufacturing Regulations
Analysis of the correlates related to the adoption of manufacturing reg-
ulations and workers’ compensation show that states with more workers
per establishment tended to adopt the new policies earlier. Using the panel
information in manufacturing, I estimated a proportional hazard model
with time-varying covariates for the introduction of the two types of man-
ufacturing regulations: ﬁrst, the initial introduction of some form of labor
administrative body with or without coercive power; second, the introduc-
tion of factory inspectors to enforce regulations. Since most states had
their own mine inspection departments, most of the bureaus and factory
inspectors specialized in manufacturing; therefore, the correlates in the
adoption analysis are focused on measures of manufacturing activity. In
the underlying panel of data, states who have not yet adopted are observed
at the end of each decade and matched with information on average size
and the number of manufacturing workers from the beginning of the
decade. The state’s ﬁnal year in the panel is its year of adoption, which is
matched with information from the prior census. See the notes to table 9.4
for a more detailed description.
The results in table 9.4 show that larger establishments were associated
with earlier adoption of both factory administrations and factory inspec-
tors. Hazard ratios greater than one imply increased probability of adop-
tion in any year given no prior adoption (consistent with earlier adoption),
and ratios less than one imply decreased probability of adoption in any
year (consistent with later adoption). At the margin an increase of one
worker per establishment was associated with a 5.8 percent higher proba-
bility of adoption of some form of labor administration, and 5.3 percent
higher probability of adopting a factory inspector law. Both are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. It is relatively common to see diﬀer-
ences in correlates across states of 1 standard deviation in either direction.
A one standard deviation increase in average ﬁrm size of 5.3 workers per
establishment was associated with roughly a one-third increase in the
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14. In the regressions, I have experimented with other control variables, but none were
found to be statistically signiﬁcant in the analysis. I tried several measures of political activ-
ity in all of the adoption and coal regulation equations, including shares of votes for populist
presidential candidates in the 1890s, voting for Republicans and Socialists for president in the
1900s, and Poole and Rosenthal’s (1993) spatial coordinates for the location of U.S. senators
along conservative/liberal spectrums and rural/urban spectrums at various times. The mea-
sures generally had small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects. Since Mark Aldrich (1997) and
William Graebner (1976) suggest that large explosions contributed to expanded regulations,
I developed a measure of large-scale accidents for the study in table 9.6, but its impact was al-
ways small and statistically insigniﬁcant.Table 9.4 Hazard ratios for factors inﬂuencing the introduction of state labor administrations
and factory inspectors, 1869–1930
(1) (2)
Hazard 1  SD Hazard 1  SD
Variable Mean SD ratio eﬀect ratio eﬀect
A. Introduction of some form of labor administration
Manufacturing workers  7.57 5.34 1.058 0.31 1.056 0.30
per establishment (3.24) (2.83)
Manufacturing workers (000s) 33.82 63.92 1.005 0.32 1.006 0.38
(2.48) (4.03)
Manufacturing union  30.91 68.86 1.003 0.21
chapters, 1880 (0.71)
Union index 6.11 3.05 1.019 0.06
(0.55)
Southern state 0.29 0.734 0.725
(–1.06) (–1.14)
p 2.811 2.736
Wald chi-square 47.30 45.82
(3) (4)
Hazard 1  SD Hazard 1  SD
Variable Mean SD ratio eﬀect ratio eﬀect
B. Introduction of factory inspector
Manufacturing workers  7.90 5.26 1.053 0.28 1.054 0.28
per establishment (1.74) (1.65)
Manufacturing workers (000s) 41.66 68.32 1.009 0.61 1.008 0.55
(5.91) (7.51)
Manufacturing union  32.36 73.18 0.998 –0.15
chapters, 1880 (–1.49)
Union index 6.67 3.35 0.973 –0.09
(–0.62)
Southern state 0.29 0.419 0.429
(–2.06) (–1.99)
p 3.254 3.420
Wald chi-square 110.63 110.29
Notes and sources: The 1 standard deviation (SD) eﬀect is the change in the probability of adoption in a
speciﬁc year given that the state had not yet adopted associated with a one standard deviation increase
in the variable. The values are hazard ratios from a Weibull hazard estimation with time-varying covari-
ates. The z-scores in parentheses below the hazard ratios are based on robust standard errors and the null
hypothesis that the hazard ratios are equal to one. If h(t)   h0(t) e X(t) , then each hazard ratio reported
above equals eb, where b is an element of  . Time zero (t   0) is 1860 in the model. The Weibull model
assumes that the hazard takes the form h(t)   pt p–1eX(t) . Time zero (t   0) is 1860 in the model. Esti-
mates for p in all of the models are statistically diﬀerent from one in Wald chi-square tests with four de-
grees of freedom, implying that the probability of adoption rose substantially over time.
Information on the timing of adoption is in table 9.2. Observations in the data set were constructed
the following way. States were observed in the last year of the decade with information on workers and
workers per establishment from the beginning of the decade. In the year the state adopted, the year for
that observation is the year of adoption. For example, Maine adopted its ﬁrst labor administrative law
in 1887. The ﬁrst Maine observation is for the end of the 1860s, the year is recorded as 1869, the adop-
tion indicator is zero, and values for average workers per establishment and total workers are from 1860. conditional probability of adopting some form of labor administration in
any year and a one-fourth increase in the probability of introducing a fac-
tor inspector.
The ﬁndings are inconsistent with the view that large ﬁrms were suc-
cessful at obstructing the introduction of legislation. The adoption of the
early labor administrations without inspection might have been a situation
where both large ﬁrms and unions anticipated beneﬁts, or where unions
succeeded in imposing the legislation on larger employers. The union haz-
ard ratios are all greater than one, consistent with unions contributing to
earlier adoption. Although we cannot reject the hypothesis of no eﬀect in
the statistical model, extra qualitative evidence from Elizabeth Brandeis
(1935) suggests that these early labor bureaus were often created in re-
sponse to pressures from the National Labor Union and the Knights of
Labor.
The adoption of factory inspection is more consistent with the raising-
rivals’-costs model in a situation where reformers and reformers were not
anticipating much gain. While large ﬁrms were associated with earlier
adoption, unions were not. The hazard ratios for the union measures were
both less than one, and increases of 1 standard deviation in the union mea-
sures reduced the probability of adoption in any one year by 9 to 15 per-
cent. The eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant, so it is too strong at this
point to say that unions were categorically opposed to the introduction of
the factory inspectors. Yet there is evidence that union leaders circa 1900
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Table 9.4 (continued)
The second Maine observation records the year as 1879, the adoption indicator is zero, and the census
values are from the 1870 census. Since Maine adopted in 1887, the ﬁnal Maine observation shows the
year as 1887, the adoption indicator as one, and the values for workers per establishment and total work-
ers are from the 1880 census. For Massachusetts, which adopted in 1869, I included a value for 1865 with
census information from 1860 attached; the 1869 observation uses 1870 census information. There were
179 observations for the analysis of the introduction of any labor administration, with three of the forty-
eight states not adopting by 1930. In the factory inspector analysis there were 229 observations, with
eight of the forty-eight states not adopting by 1930. Information on workers and establishments from the
censuses for 1860, 1870, 1880, and 1890 is from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1895, pp. 67–69). Data on
workers and establishments from the 1900, 1910, and 1920 censuses are from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1933, pp. 43–600, and 1902, pp. 58–61). In the 1904 manufacturing census, the Census Bureau focused
the survey on factories and eliminated the hand trades. I spliced the data for total workers and workers
per establishment after 1900 with the earlier series by multiplying by the ratio in 1900 of workers in fac-
tories and hand trades to workers in factories. The same procedure was followed for workers per estab-
lishment. Information on unionization at the state level is sparse, and two measures of unionization were
tried. Neither fully covers the period. The union index is described by Fishback and Kantor (2000,
p. 263), who developed it for 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929 for their workers’ compensation study. High val-
ues of the index imply that the state has a higher share of workers in industries that at the national level
were more unionized. For observations prior to 1899, the 1899 values of the index were used to approx-
imate the union index for observations. In the other version of the estimation, the number of manufac-
turing union chapters is the number of local unions and chapters of national unions associated with
manufacturing in the state as of 1880 from the Weeks Report (Weeks, 1886, pp. 14–19). States were given
the same value in each year observed. Southern states included Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and all states south and east of those states.were skeptical of the beneﬁts of regulation on the grounds that business
interests wielded signiﬁcant clout in the legislatures and were likely to
strongly inﬂuence the writing of the regulations. Instead, they focused on
organizing drives in which they argued that workers would beneﬁt more
through the collective bargaining process than they would by relying on leg-
islatures (Weinstein 1967, p. 159; Skocpol 1992, pp. 205–47; Asher 1969,
p. 457).
The adoption of workers’ compensation in the 1910s, on the other hand,
was a win-win situation for large ﬁrms, unions, and reform groups. In sta-
tistical work on the timing of adoption of workers’ compensation Shawn
Kantor and I (Fishback and Kantor 1998, 2000, pp. 106–11, 256–57)
found that large ﬁrms, unions, and reform groups all were associated with
earlier adoption of the laws. These relationships showed up in comparisons
of means for groups of states who adopted earlier, as well as in multivari-
ate analysis with a wide range of controls. In addition, there was ample
qualitative evidence that all three groups after 1909 lobbied for the general
concept of workers’ compensation although in some states there were in-
tense struggles over the choice of beneﬁt levels and the state’s role in insur-
ing workplace accident risk.
9.3.2 Average Mine Size and Coal Regulations
The results are quite diﬀerent for the relationship between average mine
size and the adoption of coal mining regulations from 1869 to the mid-
1890s. I estimated a similar proportional hazards model for a panel of data
for the twenty-four states that produced more than 500,000 tons of bitu-
minous coal consistently by 1925. An additional cross-sectional observa-
tion has been added for Pennsylvania anthracite coal because Pennsylva-
nia adopted separate regulations and inspection departments at diﬀerent
times for the two types of coal. More details on this panel are found in the
notes of table 9.5. Larger coal mines were not associated with earlier adop-
tion of the coal safety legislation, whether large mines are measured in
terms of workers per mine or output per mine. The hazard ratios in table
9.5 are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, and the eﬀects of
changes of 1 standard deviation are very small. The absence of a relation-
ship between adoption and mine size suggests that either large ﬁrms were
indiﬀerent to the coal regulations or they were unsuccessful at staving oﬀ
the eﬀorts of reformers. The impact of unionization suggests that it might
have been the latter. An increase of 1 standard deviation in the number of
coal union chapters in the state raised the probability of adoption in a spe-
ciﬁc state by 40 to 47 percent.
More insight into the role played by large ﬁrms can be gained by exam-
ining their impact on the breadth of regulation and the resources devoted
to enforcement. I created a panel data set for the years 1902, 1910, 1920,
and 1930 for the twenty-three leading bituminous coal mining states with
304 Price V. FishbackTable 9.5 Factors inﬂuencing the introduction of coal mine safety laws, 1869–1912
(1) (2)
Hazard OSD Hazard OSD 
Mean SD ratio eﬀect ratio eﬀect
Coal workers per mine 42.41 51.34 1.001 0.05
(0.38)
Coal workers in state (000s) 2.28 6.85 1.047 0.32
(2.11)
Tons per mine (000s) 18.67 27.41 0.999 –0.03
(–0.08)
Total tons in state (millions) 0.89 2.29 1.164 0.38
(2.09)
Coal union chapters 3.38 8.99 1.052 0.47 1.044 0.40
(2.50) (1.72)
Southern state 0.28 0.400 0.398
(–1.74) (–1.80)
p 3.417 3.271
Wald chi-square (4) 86.19 62.24
Notes and sources: A 1 standard deviation (OSD) eﬀect is the change in the probability of adoption in a
speciﬁc year, given that the state had not yet adopted, associated with a 1 standard deviation increase in
the variable. The values are hazard ratios from a Weibull hazard estimation with time-varying covari-
ates. The z-scores in parentheses below the hazard ratios are based on robust standard errors and the null
hypothesis that the hazard ratios are equal to one. For notes on the Weibull hazard model see table 9.4.
Time zero is 1860. Estimates for p in all of the models are statistically diﬀerent from one in Wald chi-
square tests with four degrees of freedom, implying that the probability of adoption rose substantially
over time. Observations in the data set were constructed the following way. States were observed in the
last year of the decade and were matched with information on miners, miners per mine, tons produced,
and tons per mine from the beginning of the decade. In the decade when the state adopted, the year of
the observation was the year of adoption. For example, West Virginia adopted its mine safety law in
1883. The ﬁrst West Virginia observation is for the end of the 1860s, the year is recorded as 1869, the
adoption indicator is zero, and values for miners et al. are from 1860. The second West Virginia obser-
vation records the year as 1879, the adoption indicator is zero, and the census values are from the 1870
census. Since West Virginia adopted in 1883, the ﬁnal West Virginia observation shows the year as 1883
and the adoption indicator as one, and the values for workers per establishment and total workers are
from the 1880 census. For Pennsylvania anthracite, which adopted in 1869, I included a value for 1865
with census information from 1860 attached; the 1869 observation uses 1870 census information. States
were not included in the sample unless they consistently produced more than 100,000 tons of coal by the
1920s. Anthracite and bituminous coal in Pennsylvania are treated as two separate state observations
because Pennsylvania had separate regulatory codes and inspection staﬀs for the diﬀerent types of coal.
Southern states were Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Vir-
ginia. The twenty-ﬁve states led to seventy-nine observations, and all states adopted the law during the
period under study. Information on production, number of mines, and employees is from the following
U.S. mining censuses: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1865, pp. clxxiii–clxxiv) for 1860; (1872, pp. 760–67)
for 1870; (1886, pp. 681–87) for 1880; (1892, pp. 347–48) for 1890; and (1905, 709–17) for 1902. Infor-
mation for 1910 came from U.S. Geological Survey (various years). The coal union chapters ﬁgure is the
number of local unions and chapters of national unions associated with coal mining from the Weeks Re-
port (Weeks, 1886, pp. 14–19). The number of chapters in Pennsylvania were split evenly between the an-
thracite and bituminous observation. The number of chapters was the same for each state for all years
that they were observed.evidence on the breadth of coal mining regulations and the appropriations
for coal mining inspection per coal worker in the state measured in 1967
dollars (see table 9.1).15 The information on regulations and inspection
budgets was then matched in the panel with evidence on the average num-
ber of employees per mine in the state, the United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica (UMWA) membership as a percentage of the coal workforce in the
state, and the number of miners in the state. Estimations are also per-
formed with ﬁrm size and industry scale measured as production per mine
and total production.
The model is estimated both without and with state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation controls for some types of unmeasured
heterogeneity across states and time. The year eﬀects are incorporated to
control for shocks to the national economy and technological shocks to
mining technology common to the entire mining industry in each year that
would have inﬂuenced the choice of safety regulations and the level of in-
spection at particular points in time. The state eﬀects are included to cap-
ture geological diﬀerences in mining deposits that inﬂuenced mining prac-
tices as well as long-term attitudes toward political reform that were
invariant across time within the states.
The panel regression results in table 9.6are consistent with the view that
large coal employers worked to limit breadth of the legislation, possibly
oﬀsetting eﬀorts by coal unions to expand the regulations. The law index
displays a negative relationship with average mine size that is stronger with
controls for state and time eﬀects. The coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at conﬁdence levels of roughly 15 percent in two-tailed tests. Increases
of 1 standard deviation in average mine size led to reductions in the law
index of close to half of a law. The large employers’ eﬀorts to restrict the
breadth of laws appear to have been counteracting lobbying by the
UMWA. In the estimation without state and year eﬀects, increases of 1
standard deviation in the percentage of miners in the UMWA were asso-
ciated with a more than half a law increase in the regulatory index. The
UMWA’s eﬀorts appear to have been correlated with time-invariant fea-
tures in the states, because the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in the model re-
duces the size and statistical signiﬁcance of the UMWA coeﬃcient.
Even after limiting the breadth of legislation, larger mines were also as-
sociated with reduced resources for enforcement. Average mine size dis-
plays a negative relationship with the inspection budget per coal worker
that increases in size and in statistical signiﬁcance with the inclusion of
state and year eﬀects. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates in panel A in table 9.6 sug-
gest that a 1 standard deviation increase of 35.7 workers per mine is asso-
ciated with a reduction in the inspection budget of 64¢ per worker in 1967
306 Price V. Fishback
15. North Dakota was in the adoption sample, but missing data forced its elimination from























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.dollars. Similarly, a 1 standard deviation increase in tons produced per
mine in panel B in table 9.6 was associated with 55¢ per worker less in the
inspection budget. There may be other explanations for the negative rela-
tionship between average mine size and inspection budgets. If there were
substantial economies of scale in inspecting each mine, a smaller inspec-
tion budget per mine worker might have achieved the same results as the
average mine increases in size. However, there was plenty of evidence that
reformers were pressing for large budgets per worker to enhance enforce-
ment and reduce accident rates. They were right to do so, as empirical stud-
ies show that increased inspection budgets inspection per worker (or per
ton) were associated with lower accident rates (see Aldrich 1997, pp. 337–
38, and Fishback 1986 and 1992).
Meanwhile, the UMWA share of employment had no positive relation-
ship with the size of mine inspection budgets. Problems with inadequate in-
spections and the emphasis on prosecutions of miners in some of the states
documented later in the paper might have led the UMWA to shift their
eﬀorts away from pressing for stronger government enforcement of the
laws. Instead, they relied on their own negotiations with employers to press
for compliance with the aspects of the code that the union was interested
in enforcing.
9.4 Narrative Evidence on Employer Inﬂuence in Coal Mining
The quantitative analysis suggests that larger coal employers adopted a
defensive strategy against coal mining regulations rather than one of rais-
ing rivals’ costs. Large ﬁrms were not associated with later adoption of the
early coal regulations, but they were negatively related with the breadth of
coal regulations and the size of the inspection budget. The view that large
employers were following a defensive strategy receives ample support from
narrative evidence from various states at various times.
The leading studies of coal mining legislation all suggest that employers
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the writing of coal regulations.16 Mark Aldrich
(1997, pp. 69–71), for example, ﬁnds that most of the early laws were “in-
complete, poorly written, and hard to enforce” and often bore “the strong
imprint of operator inﬂuence.” In Colorado, mine inspectors considered
the original 1883 law to be “very incomplete” and “wholly inadequate.”
When the law was revised in 1913, it was “the product of a committee dom-
inated by large operators . . . and it largely codiﬁed their practices.”
William Graebner’s (1976, pp. 72–87) description of the evolution of
West Virginia mining law suggests that through 1907 the law had little or
no bite. Mine operators and even the mine inspectors were opposed to new
legislation. In cases where proposed laws limited their mining methods, the
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16. See Aldrich (1997), Fishback (1992), and Graebner (1976).workers themselves actively opposed change. In response to a series of
large mine explosions, the legislature passed a revision in 1907 in which
mine operators played a major role. Two additional explosions led the chief
mine inspector to become more of an activist in proposing legislation, yet
an investigative committee that studied many of the explosions published
a report that concluded that changes in the law would do no good. The leg-
islature, in response to the demands of mine operators, rejected all of the
chief mine inspector’s recommendations for new regulations.
One sign that the mining laws were inﬂuenced by employers is that a
number of them restricted the behavior of miners in ways that employers
had had trouble enforcing within their mines. These restrictions often pro-
moted safety but required extra eﬀort for no obvious gain in pay on the
part of the miners. For example, both Illinois and West Virginia banned the
practice of “shooting oﬀ the solid,” in which miners blasted without mak-
ing an undercut at the base of the seam. The practice required more explo-
sives, produced smaller, less valuable chunks of coal, and generally was
considered more dangerous. It was popular with miners because it was
much less strenuous than lying on one’s side and hacking away at a wall of
coal and rock for several hours before blasting the coal. The miners’ re-
sponse was to routinely disregard these and other restrictions that they
found onerous.17 When I estimated the impact of coal mining laws on acci-
dent rates (Fishback 1986, 1992, pp. 115–20) there were only three regula-
tions that passed statistical signiﬁcance tests in reducing accident rates: re-
quirements that foremen visit workplaces more often, that miners use
permissible explosives, and that miners not ride on coal cars. All of these
are devoted at least in part to monitoring and changing the behavior of
miners, which is consistent with a view that employers used regulations to
help them enforce their own desired limits on the miners’ behavior.
Lobbyists who are trying to take the teeth out of legislation often seek to
limit the funds available for enforcement. In a number of states, there were
not enough inspectors budgeted to meet the minimum number of visits of
mines required in the mining statutes.18 Low salaries led to high turnover
of inspectors and limited the department’s ability to attract talented in-
spectors. Inspectors earned only about 50 percent more than the average
salaried worker in manufacturing in 1910 and less than 10 percent more
in 1920.19 West Virginia Governor John Cornwell in 1919 described their
rate of pay as “less than that of men who drive mules” (quoted in Graebner
1976, p. 90). With larger budgets, the mine departments likely would have
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17. See Aldrich (1997, pp. 58–73) and Graebner (1976, pp. 94–95).
18. See Fishback (1992, p. 113) and Graebner (1976).
19. Comparisons are based on mine inspector salaries in state mining laws and average an-
nual earnings of coal miners (Fishback 1992, pp. 80–81) and average annual earnings for
salaried workers in manufacturing from the manufacturing census (U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus 1933, vol. 3, pp. 43–600).had an impact on accident rates, as econometric studies by Fishback (1986,
1992) and Aldrich (1997, pp. 337–38) ﬁnd that expansions in resources for
inspection were associated with lower accident rates.20
Although much of Graebner’s (1976) work on mine safety implies that
many mine inspectors were honest advocates for safer mines, there were
still worries about a revolving door between mine management and the
inspection service. There were few opportunities to move up within the in-
spection bureaucracies, so some state mine inspectors accepted positions
with coal companies at 50 to 100 percent pay increases. Many state in-
spectors were already sympathetic to the problems mine owners faced in
running mines because they had moved to the job from posts as mining
managers or superintendents. Union leaders were livid when the coal mine
operators in 1908 “engineered” the appointment to West Virginia chief
mine inspector of John Laing, himself the owner of several mining proper-
ties. After leaving oﬃce, Laing became the head of the Kanawha County
Coal Operators’ Association.21
Mine owners were not shy about pressuring the inspectors. In 1908 a
West Virginia inspector stated “there are coal operators who will endeavor
to have a district inspector removed from oﬃce rather than obey the min-
ing laws, or carry out the recommendations made by an inspector.” As a
general rule, the mine owners appear to have had the advantage in the in-
terest group struggle over inspector appointments, even in highly union-
ized states. In Illinois, where the UMWA was strong and the inspection
staﬀ had a reputation for being somewhat radical, a frustrated miner
claimed: “There is not an inspector in the state who is not holding his job
through the inﬂuences of some coal operator” (Graebner 1976, p. 91).
Most mining laws contained ﬁnes and potential jail sentences for oﬀen-
ders, but the inspectors could not impose these unilaterally. Instead, they
disclosed their ﬁndings to a state or local government prosecutor who de-
cided whether to take the oﬀenders to court. The courts determined
whether there was a violation and set the size ofthe ﬁne.22There is little ev-
idence of prosecutions of employers for mining violations in Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and West Virginia prior to 1904. The number of prosecutions then
rose to a peak at 395 in 1910 and 312 in 1911 (compared with approxi-
mately 3,200 mines and 250,000 employees) before trailing oﬀ to zero after
1912. Nearly all of these prosecutions were targeted at miners and not su-
pervisors or mine owners. Miners accounted for 159 of the 163 prosecu-
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20. Spending on factory inspection may have been less eﬀective than spending on mine in-
spection. Estimates of the impact of state inspection budgets by David Buﬀum (1992) and
James Chelius (1977) on measures of fatal accidents in industry do not ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant reductions in accident risk.
21. See Graebner (1976, pp. 90–91) and Corbin (1981, p. 17).
22. In a handful of states the coal mine inspector had the power to close a mine considered
unsafe, but even here the inspector had to secure an injunction through the proper court
(Graebner 1976, pp. 97–100).tions in West Virginia in 1910. Of 489 prosecutions between 1908 and 1911
in Pennsylvania, 392 were directed at mine workers, only 27 at superinten-
dents, and 70 at foreman and ﬁre bosses (Graebner 1976, pp. 97–100). Fur-
ther, the probability of paying penalties was even lower. In Ohio in 1911 the
total amount collected in ﬁnes under a new mining law came to $400, and
this was a law described as having strong penalty provisions.
One reason for the lack of prosecutions may have been the intransigence
of the courts. According to Graebner (1976, p. 99), when coal inspectors
closed mines, which they did infrequently, they “received as much opposi-
tion as aid from local courts”:
West Virginia inspectors, moreover, evidently ceased prosecuting oper-
ators and managers when it became clear that they could not be con-
victed....  A  district inspector reported that workers had ‘completely
lost all conﬁdence in the local courts . . . [and were] thoroughly con-
vinced that justice could not be obtained towards the enforcement of the
mining laws.’
9.5 Employer Inﬂuence of Legislation and Enforcement in Manufacturing
Earlier adoption of the initial manufacturing regulations in states with
larger establishments is consistent with both the reform and raising-rivals’-
costs hypotheses. A completed data set on the factory inspection resources
and the breadth of the speciﬁc manufacturing safety regulations is not yet
available, so I cannot do the same tests that I did for coal mining. Qualita-
tive evidence, however, suggests that at least in some states manufacturers
wielded the same types of inﬂuence as coal employers did over the type of
laws adopted. Problems with enforcement of regulations also carried over
into manufacturing.
The introduction of factory safety legislation in Washington State in
1903 oﬀers an example of how manufacturing employers inﬂuenced the
writing of safety legislation. Safety regulations often served as focal points
in negligence cases for issues related to “due care” and “assumption of
risk.” Employer violation of regulations eased the burden for workers in
demonstrating employer negligence, while the absence of a violation could
prevent recovery. When workers violated regulations targeted at their ac-
tivities, employers were better able to invoke the contributory negligence
defense.
Washington employers pressed for factory safety legislation in reaction
to a series of court decisions related to the negligence liability system. One
aspect of the assumption of risk defense had always been a major irritant
to workers and reformers. In a number of cases workers reported malfunc-
tions or lack of safeguards that increased their risk of injury, were told to
return to work, and then were injured. Compensation had been denied on
the basis that the workers had known the risk in the now more dangerous
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American Company (1902) the Washington Supreme Court eliminated the
assumption of risk defense in these situations. Fearing the complete elimi-
nation of the assumption of risk defense, employers played a signiﬁcant
role in the passage of Washington’s Factory Inspection Act in 1903. Under
the new act employers were to be considered negligent for accidents in set-
tings where they violated the inspection acts. However, the law also pro-
vided for certiﬁcations that the employers’ workplace was “safe.” A num-
ber of lower courts then invoked the assumption of risk defense to prevent
recovery by injured workers in several cases involving mines so certiﬁed.
The Washington State Supreme Court disagreed and reaﬃrmed that lack
of safeguards on machines was negligence whether the mine was certiﬁed
or not. In 1905 the employers went back to the legislature and succeeded
in altering the language of the Inspection Act so that employers had only
to provide a “reasonable” safeguard (as opposed to a “proper” one). This
change in language may have worked for a while but ultimately proved to
be of little help to the employers, because the Supreme Court ﬁnally elim-
inated the assumption of risk defense by arguing that a machine lacked
necessary safeguards by virtue of being the cause an accident (Tripp 1976,
p. 535).
Inadequacy of inspection resources might have been an even more se-
vere problem for the factory inspectors than for coal inspectors. There
were far more factories than mines, and Brandeis (1935, pp. 632–33) notes
that inspectors typically investigated only upon complaint. Rarely were the
factory inspectors in a position to routinely and randomly inspect a sig-
niﬁcant share of the factories. Problems with enforcement likely con-
tributed to the conditions that led to the deaths of 146 garment workers in
the horrendous Triangle Shirtwaist Fire in New York City in 1911.23On the
day of the ﬁre, many workers reported that a key door to a stairway was
locked, a violation of the factory regulations.
Just prior to the ﬁre a State Labor Department inspector had reported
an inadequate ﬁre escape (Stein 1962, pp. 181–89), but jurisdictions over
ﬁre escapes were not well established. The factory inspection laws gave the
inspector the power to demand a proper ﬁre escape, but the factory in-
spectors claimed that the courts had ruled that ﬁre escapes were outside
the labor department’s jurisdiction. Building safety therefore came under
the jurisdiction of the New York City superintendent of buildings, to
whom a report had been forwarded by the labor inspector. When the Asch
building, where the ﬁre broke out, was planned in 1900, the building in-
spector had agreed to allow the architects to forgo a required staircase be-
cause they promised that the ﬁre escape they planned would act as a third
staircase all the way to the ground. When the building was erected, the
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When this was pointed out in 1911, Building Department oﬃcials de-
fended themselves by saying that their resources were inadequate. The
department had only forty-seven inspectors to inspect 50,000 buildings.
They claimed: “We do not hear of violations of the law in the old build-
ings unless they are particularly called to our attention.” In that year the
Fire Department had designated over 13,000 buildings as dangerous, but
the department could only inspect 2,051. Once they found a violation, the
building inspectors argued, they still faced signiﬁcant obstacles in pun-
ishing the violators. “We must enforce all our rulings through the civil
courts. When we bring an action, there is invariably a long ﬁght. The
record will show the owner is usually the victor.” In other cases they hesi-
tated to call for changes because “It would work a great hardship on the
owners of buildings to require changes. This is especially true of ﬁre es-
capes.”24
In the aftermath of the Triangle Fire the State Labor Department was
overhauled and New York State adopted a series of new ﬁre-related regu-
lations. Appropriations for labor issues in New York quadrupled between
1911 and 1915 to over a million dollars, but this coincided with expansions
of duties in other areas and the development of workers’ compensation.
Although this is described as the golden era of labor regulations in New
York, the inspection budgets per manufacturing worker were lower there
than inspection budgets per miner in most coal mining states.25 The in-
crease in budgets still did not resolve the enforcement issue. A February
1916 editorial in the New York Times claimed that of 3,711 violations by
factories of the new stairway regulations, “only 246 owners complied with
the law, and two prosecutions were begun!” (The Industrial Commission,”
New York Times, February 23, 1916, p. 12).26
9.6 Summary
Did large employers subvert workplace safety reform? I found few ex-
amples of documented bribery or other illegal corruption, but there was
considerable evidence that a number of actions by large employers met the
broader deﬁnition of subversion in the introduction. The quantitative
analysis of the relationship between average establishment size and regula-
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24. Quoted in Stein (1962, p. 116).
25. The new million-dollar budget in New York came to only about 69¢ per manufactur-
ing worker. Probably no more than half of the budget was devoted to inspections. Thus, 35¢
per worker in 1914, which translates into $1.16 in 1967 dollars, was below many of the ﬁgures
for mining inspection in 1902 in table 9.1.
26. Problems with inadequate inspections remain today, but the sanctions when such prob-
lems are caught are much greater. See McEvoy (1995, pp. 648–50).tions in the states and the analytical narratives suggest that we cannot tell
one coherent story about the inﬂuence of large employers. Rather, we must
tell one story for coal mining and another for manufacturing. In the coal
industry, large employers practiced a defensive strategy, limiting the
breadth of mining regulation and inspection resources per miner. Large
employers in manufacturing, on the other hand, were associated with ear-
lier adoption of safety regulations and workers’ compensation.
A question remains as to why large employers adopted a defensive strat-
egy in coal mining and less so in manufacturing. My sense is that there were
two key factors, the focus on one industry in the coal regulations and the
lack of women working in the mines. Coal regulations were targeted nar-
rowly at a speciﬁc industry, while manufacturing regulations and workers’
compensation often covered a broad range of industries. Labor relations in
mining were more fractious than in most industries, and the reform pro-
posals that employers opposed were often made by unions. The organiza-
tion of opposition to objectionable laws was made easier by the narrowly
deﬁned interests of the large coal employers, who were already organized
into coal associations to deal with labor relations and other issues speciﬁc
to the industry. Since mines were often in isolated areas, coal employers
wielded much greater political clout locally and thus likely had more inﬂu-
ence over the enforcement of the laws in the courts (Fishback 1992, 1995).
Manufacturing safety regulations, on the other hand, covered a broader
range of industries, and the regulations might have left many industries
only mildly constrained. Large employers interested in ﬁghting the laws
therefore found it more diﬃcult than in coal mining to organize the ﬁght
across a set of employers in diﬀerent industries.
Another key factor explaining the diﬀerence in strategies was the gen-
der of the workers involved. Coal mines employed no women. Reformers
found protective labor legislation of all kinds easier to sell for women and
children, while employers found such legislation harder to obstruct. A
number of the manufacturing safety regulations were designed to improve
safety and workplace conditions for women and children in textiles and
other industries. Thus, large employers who had moved away from em-
ploying women and children found it fruitful to join with reformers in
pressing for regulations that raised the costs to employers who still relied
on them. The protection of women and children likely played an impor-
tant role in the introduction of workers’ compensation, as well. Workers’
compensation received so much support in part because it insured that the
share of women and children receiving compensation when their bread-
winners were injured or killed rose to 100 percent from less than 50 per-
cent under negligence liability. This move dovetailed with Progressive Era
mothers’ pension programs that provided beneﬁts to widows and chil-
dren.
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